(Ottawa) An investigation by Canada’s Spy Service has concluded that a senior RCMP officer may have been overly sensitive to Russian intelligence services for years over money, ego and business frustrations, according to recently released documents.
Mol Hunters determined that Gilles Germain Brunette was a Soviet KGB agent from the late 1960s to the 1970s. Access to information law.
Mr. Brunett’s betrayal has long been the subject of gossip, at least in the early 1990’s and in newspaper articles and books. But so far, Canadian intelligence officials have not publicly confirmed his actions or released details of the investigation. There was a mole.
Gilles Germain Brunett, a heavy drinker with a high lifestyle, died of an apparent heart attack on April 9, 1984, when intelligence investigators approached him.
Under the Information Access Act, Mr. The Canadian Press filed a complaint with the Federal Information Commissioner in 2015, following CSIS ‘initial refusal to release Brunett’s files. Six years later, the intelligence services agreed to publish hundreds of pages, although some documents have been heavily edited.
The RCMP Review of Activity Records involving the Soviets from 1967 to 1973 did not reveal any traces that could identify the officer. Reviews of hundreds of personal files and interviews with members revealed nothing definite.
Nevertheless, according to the CSIS report, Mr. Brunet was considered a “prime suspect”. “As a result, an in-depth investigation was conducted to prove his innocence and to determine the identity of the KGB agent who joined the service. ”
Gilles Germain Brunett joined the RCMP in 1955 after serving in the Army. He left the Federal Forces and worked for an insurance company for a few years. He then returned and spent most of the 1960s in Ottawa with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. His father, Joseph Brunett, was head of the RCMP’s security division in the 1950s.
Young Brunet graduated from Russian school in 1967 with marital problems and debt. In 1968, he was transferred to Montreal and continued to work on security issues. He was fired by the RCMP in 1973 for refusing to sever ties with someone suspected of having links to the underworld.
Mr. Brunett entered the private security sector and later sold pre-arranged funerals.
He was seen as intelligent, combative and ambitious, but according to internal records, “stingy, vindictive and immoral”. “When it suited his needs, he was very outgoing and crowded. He played ‘hard’ and was very drunk.
In December 1983, a security analyst, Mr. Dug up Brunett’s past.
First, Mr. No Soviet business known to Brunett came into being, although there were operational successes in other parts of the country during the period in question.
Second, in each of the cases documented by the mole hunters, the investigator’s note points out that “the actions died immediately after Mr. Brunet learned of it.”
Mr. Not only did Brunett compromise, he seems to have given the Soviet masters everything he could get his hands on.
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Subsequent inquiries will include several interviews with active and retired members of the Security Service and acquaintances and contacts.
Several sources who spoke to officials said it was not surprising that Gilles Jermaine Brunett – later identified by the code name “notebook” – was a prime suspect not only because he had a grudge against RCMP, but also because “his character and his loyalty were questionable”, the CSIS report said.
Investigators cited two key incidents that emerged from their inquiries.
In 1968 Mr. An envelope containing $ 960 on $ 20 bills was found in Brunett’s car glove box at the time he was in financial crisis and his annual salary was less than $ 10,000. No satisfactory explanation.
A former employee of a bar at the Skyline Hotel in Ottawa was asked to look at the photos, Mr. Investigators believe Brunett met someone there more than once, whose name has been mentioned. This is Mr. All indications are that Brunett’s KGB connection.
In February 1984, detectives found Gilles Germain Brunett’s address in Montreal, near Mount Royal, obtained aerial photographs of the area and noted that his house was in view of the Soviet embassy.
RCMP, in early April 1984 Mr. For several days following Brunett, he secretly observed a cleaner, a grocer, and a visit to the pizzeria the day before he died.
In the year of Gilles Germain Brunett’s death, the newly formed CSIS took over the intelligence functions of the RCMP Security Service, which was disbanded after a series of scandals that led to the formation of a commission of inquiry.
Inspired by additional information obtained in 1985 or early 1986, Mr. CSIS continued Brunett’s investigation. Although the details have been removed from the files, this lead – as it was in 1982 – is believed to have come from a loser.
Investigators examined the evidence and interviewed many more, apparently not excluding the other suspects. The spy service was led by Mr. Executed warrants for records recording Brunett’s bank transactions, which they gave him the new code name “Coach”.
A 1987 CSIS report to John Dait clarifies that the intelligence service “confirms” that Gilles Germain Brunet was an agent recruited by the Soviet intelligence services.
Mr. with former colleagues. The CSIS concluded that Brunett’s involvement did not end his service to the KGB since his dismissal from the Security Service in 1973.
In August 1986, Mr. CSIS began to assess the damage caused by Brunett.
The document, prepared for a conference in 1998 by Peter Marwitz, a retired security service and CSIS member, outlined the location of the hearing aids installed at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Suggested that Brunet had exposed and betrayed the actions of a Canadian army stationed in Moscow. . According to the document, Brunet raised a total of $ 700,000 from the KGB.
At the time, CSIS spokesman Mr. He called Marwitz’s research “speculation.”
Many of the investigators who worked on the Brunett case are either dead or refuse to talk about it.
CSIS report sent to John Deight, Mr. Brunett said that only he could express his true motivation, but that it was a combination of financial gain, ego, professional disappointment and public opinion. Mol says “the security service is a very small soldier. In a big game”.
Mr Brunett recalled that his father had reached a high level within the RCMP, and that he felt his own progress had been hampered by a lack of recognition for his expertise, the report added.
Although Brunet’s relationship with the KGB was not identified during his time with the RCMP, the RCMP searched for suspicious stains, which prompted Leslie James Bennett, the head of the civilian intelligence service. In 1993, Mr. Bennett went to Australia, where the federal government released him and compensated him.
CSIS records, in retrospect, could argue that Brunett’s treason suspicions should have been “significantly provoked” because he became the prime suspect in the 1978 internal investigation into the leaks. .
But Mr. Brunett seems to have been a mystery. One notebook summarizes him as “a very humble person” and even those who have worked with him for many years and are acquainted with him say that they “do not know him”.
CSIS spokesman John Townsend said he could not provide details of documents released under the Information Access Act.
“However, this case is a clear example of how Canada has always been targeted by hostile actors and another example of the dangers associated with internal threat,” he said. “Canada was clear and an attractive target for espionage.”
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